Abstract This paper tackles the increasingly significant problem of irrigation-induced soil salinity within a groundwater management model. Irrigation can result not only in heavier salt concentrations but also in the removal of salt from the soil through return flows. Given these contradictory observations, we are interested in the effects on soil salt concentration if irrigation efficiency is improved. We develop a model of salt concentration patterns in both soil and groundwater. We introduce a negative externality to the production process by assuming that soil degradation due to higher soil salinity affects total factor productivity. Within this framework, we show that in the presence of this externality, increasing irrigation efficiency can lead to higher or lower soil salt concentration, depending on the social cost of transferring salt from one reservoir to another.
context of climate change and uncertain future water supplies, rendering more efficient water use crucial. The provision of subsidies for more efficient irrigation technologies is besides the usual policy decision to promote groundwater conservation and to reduce the rate of decline [19] . However, the concept of irrigation efficiency is frequently misunderstood because of an over-restrictive definition. The classical definition is proposed by Israelsen et al. [17] , i.e., "the ratio of the amount of water that is stored by the irrigator in the soil root zone and ultimately consumed to the amount of water delivered to the farm," which aims at improving and targeting water application and at avoiding or completely eliminating return flows of water, water recovery, and leaching [20] . This approach thus does not take into account additional benefits obtained by applying more water in order to control soil salinity by leaching. Against this background, this paper develops a model based on the literature on groundwater economics and the literature on soil salinity and replacement flows to investigate the effect of improved irrigation efficiency on groundwater stock and soil salinity.
The literature on groundwater economics is quite well developed along two lines. One strand of work focuses exclusively on pumping patterns and on the two main externalities 1 by comparison with the socially optimal solution [12, 29, 30, 33] . Consequently, several policies (such as 1 Private management of a common pool aquifer entails several inefficiencies, but the literature widely focuses on the following: (1) the stock externality arises from the fact that water extraction by one individual reduces the stock and, in turn, increases the costs of pumping for all and (2) the strategic externality arises from competition among farmers to appropriate groundwater since property rights are not well defined (stock externality and strategic behavior result from private exploitation of a common pool resource).
water conservation policies) are discussed to promote efficient use of water. However, these policies have not ended up with long-term water savings [16, 28] . The other strand of the literature tackles the problem of polluted groundwater due to nonpoint pollution. Most of the work in this group of studies is based on a pollution control perspective and tends to ignore the relationship between contamination and water pumping decisions [14] . However, some authors do address the so-called quantity-quality problem since groundwater extraction can result in the degradation of water quality. Among others, Xepapadeas [39] provides an empirical analysis showing that the degradation of groundwater quality (caused by deep percolation resulting from irrigation) generates negative production externalities. Vickner et al. [36] and Larson et al. [22] develop dynamic empirical models that use pesticides and water withdrawal as control variables to investigate nutrient management with respect to water quality. Roseta-Palma [31, 32] or more recently Hellegers et al. [14] propose alternative models for joint quantity-quality management and show how the degradation of water quality may affect the effective use of the resource. However, these studies focus only on the degradation of groundwater quality and do not address the important issue of the interaction of this natural resource with the whole natural system. The literature on coastal aquifers addresses the quantity-quality question but also takes account of the fact that freshwater is ultimately connected to seawater, which means that freshwater quality may decline if withdrawals become excessive, allowing greater intrusion of seawater [27] . However, like some other previous works, they focus on only one aspect of the interaction, namely groundwater quality, whereas there is a bidirectional interaction. This paper goes a step further in studying quantityquality interactions in a resource management model by integrating both soil quality and groundwater quality. Degradation of the land through increased soil salinity is an ongoing problem, and in many parts of the world, it is having a negative effect on food production (for instance, through its effect on irrigated agriculture). This shows the importance of bringing the soil quality and irrigation water into a resource management model. To the best of our knowledge, there are no studies that investigate this kind of interaction within a dynamic model. Wichelns [38] examines the economic causes of waterlogging 2 and salinization in arid regions to determine the possibility of economic incentives to reduce these problems. Legras and Lifran [23] focus on the design of policy instruments to enforce farmers to take into account salinity problems caused by capillary rise,which is induced by irrigation. But they approximate salinity damages by groundwater stock. The present paper helps to fill a gap in the literature. In addition to investigating the effect of soil salinity on the effective use of groundwater, we also wonder how the quality of soil will be affected following a modification in the irrigation patterns, i.e., the effect of an incremental increase in water efficiency on long-term soil salt concentrations.
Soil salinity refers to the salt content of soil. Salt is a naturally occurring element in soil and water, and soil salinization can be due to the original soil material or irrigation water being rich in soluble salt. The process of accumulation is simple: as plants take up the water, the salt is left behind and accumulates in the root zones in the soil. Excess salt in soil has a negative impact on production because salinity makes it more difficult for plants to absorb soil moisture and some crops are destroyed. CISEAU [9] estimates that 10 to 15 % of irrigated areas over the world suffer from salinization, 0.5 to 1 % of crops are lost each year, and nearly half of all irrigated areas are threatened by excess salinization in the long term. Especially, Umali [35] reports that in the USA, China, and Pakistan, 28, 23, and 21 % of land respectively is affected by salinization. One way to control this problem is to remove the salt from the soil. The salt can be leached out from the plant root zone by applying more water to the land than what can be retained by the soil in the crop root zone, so that the excess water drains out below the root system, carrying the salt with it. Thus, the more water that is applied, in excess of the crop requirements, the lower the salinity in the root zone-despite the fact that more salt may be added as a result of this irrigation. The requirement for additional irrigation is even more crucial in arid regions with low levels of precipitation. In other words, this solution is especially relevant if the soil moisture content is low and the groundwater table is deep. Generally, irrigation should ideally take place in winter when there is more water available. However, in some parts of India, for example, leaching out of salt is most effective during the summer months when the water table is at its lowest and the soil is very dry. Thus, control of salinity by leaching out is a relevant solution (under certain conditions), but it may be challenged by the necessity to use water more efficiently, i.e., to fulfil crop requirement as close as possible. Indeed, policies for water conservation could have contradictory effects: their aim may be to improve irrigation efficiency and use less water, which could result in reduced leaching effects and therefore higher soil salinity levels. On the other hand, policies for water conservation could result in lower levels of soil salinity as a result of lower volumes of salt-carrying irrigation water being applied to the soil. This paper thus investigates whether a water conservation technology could have a perverse impact on soil salinity.
According to our objective, we introduce a quality variable in a typical groundwater extraction model. We assume that this quality variable is affected by resource withdrawals and water stocks. Following Xepapadeas [39] , we analyze a quality-quantity problem in which soil salinity generates negative externalities on production. However, we introduce a negative externality on the production process by assuming that soil degradation (due to higher soil salt concentrations) affects total factor productivity (TFP) in the sense of Barro [3] since soil salinity is not a production factor but still affects the overall production process. Our approach shares similarities with the literature dealing with the adjusted TFP or the total resource productivity, which advocates that the environmental externality contributes to output production [13, 34] . First, within this framework, we show that in the long run, for a saddle-point equilibrium to exist, the soil salt concentration and the groundwater salt concentration must be equivalent in order for a dilution process to lead to the transfer of salt from one reservoir to another until concentrations are balanced. Our main result is that higher irrigation efficiency can lead to increased soil degradation or the opposite, depending on the social cost of salinization. This means that, contrary to the results in the literature [16, 28, 37] showing that increased irrigation efficiency leads to higher stocks of water, the reverse may also be true, depending on the level of externality costs.
More generally, our analysis shows that we need to adopt a wider definition of water efficiency to take account of the role played by water as a vehicle. By taking account of the soil salt externality of irrigation, water efficiency can be seen as the speed of transfer of salt between the two water reservoirs.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 introduces the setting of our joint quantity-quality soil-groundwater model and discusses how soil salt and groundwater salt concentrations are linked and evolve over time. Section 3 introduces a socially optimal solution. Section 4 studies the existence and stability of the equilibrium and its properties. Section 5 discusses the impact of improved irrigation efficiency on soil salt concentrations and water stocks. Section 6 provides some concluding comments.
The Setting
This section presents the overall framework of water and salt dynamics and farmers' behavior.
Water Dynamics
We assume a "bathtub" type of aquifer, i.e., flat-bottomed with perpendicular sides. The stock of groundwater at time t, S(t), declines because of the extraction flow, w(t), and increases as the result of a constant natural recharge R and the quantity of water not absorbed by crops (return flows), (1 − e)w(t), with 0 < e < 1 as the irrigation efficiency coefficient. We assume that the storage capacity of the aquifer is limited to a maximum level denote S.
This irrigation efficiency coefficient measures the amount of water which is effectively used by the plants while the remaining quantity entirely returns back to the aquifer through deep percolation. This coefficient depends on exogenous parameters such as land quality and technology availability [6] [7] [8] . Consequently, irrigation efficiency is directly associated with the amount of return flows that go back to the resource. We moreover assume that return flows reach the water table almost instantaneously. Under real conditions, return flows may take years to soak into the soil. However, for the sake of simplicity, we consider a standard approximation of a more complex dynamic process. To this end, our water dynamics can be written as follows:
Salt Concentration Dynamics
Salt concentrations in the soil and the aquifer are based on three facts: (1) salt is a naturally occurring element in soil and water, (2) the salt content of the soil depends on the volume and salinity of water, and (3) water serves as the vehicle by which salt is transported into and out of both the soil root zone and the aquifer. Thus, the salt content in the root zone varies according to the quantity and the salt concentration of the water supplied which mixes with the soil water content, and the salt concentration of the water discharged from the same area. Similarly, the salt content in the aquifer depends on the amount of water it contains and the salt concentrations of the extracted water and the total recharge. The soil and the aquifer are two reservoirs of salt that are interdependent, via exchanges of water in the form of irrigation from the aquifer and deep percolation from the soil. We try to capture these interactions through the following laws of motion (see Eq. (2)).
To address the main question in this paper, for simplicity, we assume that soil moisture, θ , is constant over time, as is the total stock of salt, i.e., the sum of the salt quantities diluted in the groundwater and in the soil. According to Brandyk and Romanowicz [4] , depending on the statement of the control problem and on the time horizon, time of fluctuations of the soil moisture content may be neglected or not. Typically, in a long-term time horizon, we can consider that the soil moisture content is constant. This assumption has intuitive interpretations. Firstly, the water-holding capacity of soil may be such that there is a constant soil moisture status. Secondly, there may also be an irrigation scheme that allows soil moisture to remain constant over time. Typically, for a given crop production, the crop water requirement is fixed and the representative farmer continuously applies some water to meet this crop requirement, thus allowing for a constant soil moisture. In other words, we assume a perfect balance between the total amount of water infiltrating the soil, i.e., the sum of the natural recharge and the applied water (R + w(t)), and the quantity of water lost by the soil, i.e., the amount used by plants (given the irrigation efficiency coefficient) and the amount that percolates through the ground (ew(t) + Percolation) by a simple identification: this deep percolation corresponds to the total recharge, i.e., the sum of the natural recharge and the return flows, (R + (1 − e)w(t)).
The latter assumption related to the constant sum of the quantities of salt has also an intuitive interpretation. On the one hand, we assume that the land area is located above the aquifer and that deep percolation corresponds to a perfectly vertical movement [15] . This means that the water movement in soil is due to the gravitational force (expect the share of water absorbed by plant roots [11] ). Consequently, salts can only remain in the soil or be brought to the ground along deep percolation. On the other hand, this assumption means that there is no irrigation water that flows overland (because of the irrigation infrastructure for instance). The quantity of applied water is either absorbed by crops or reaches the aquifer in the ground: as a consequence, no salt is lost. Considering soil as a leaky reservoir from which some salts can be drained out of the system does not significatively alter our results but makes the analysis more complicated its computation. Indeed, an improved irrigation efficiency will reduce deep percolation and runoffs, which raises the question of its impact on soil salinity. This assumption allows us to have a given total stock of salt M that is the sum of the salt in the soil moisture and in the groundwater:
with C S t and C θ t respectively denoting groundwater salt and soil salt concentrations per unit of water at time t.
This means that we only need to integrate one salt concentration dynamics into the analysis. We choose the soil salt dynamics arbitrarily. As already mentioned, the variation in the concentration over time depends on the difference between the inflow of salt diluted in irrigation water and the natural recharge, which is salt-free, i.e., C S t w(t), and the outflows due to deep percolation, i.e., C θ t (1 − e)w t + R . Formally, this can be written aṡ
Net Farm Profit
The net farm profit corresponds to the value of production net of production costs.
The Production Function
Water, denoted by w, is used as a single input in a standard production function F (·) which is increasing and concave, F (·) > 0 and F (·) < 0. We ignore all other possible inputs in order to highlight the interaction between the soil and the water systems.
As we said previously, in the section above, crop water requirement, the actual volume of water used by the crop, e w, is fixed and the farmer has to decide how much water must be applied, w, to meet this requirement given the technology available (described by e).
Finally, following the agronomic literature [1, 25] , we assume that output is negatively affected by soil salinity. The review of Maas and Hoffman [25] provides universally applied criteria characterizing crop salt tolerance: it is now widely accepted that productivity decreases as salinity concentration increases. We therefore assume that TFP depends on the concentration salt, A(C θ ), and salt concentration hinders TFP. This modeling assumption is consistent with the literature which extends the measurement of TFP in agriculture in order to account for the environmental contribution to output growth which is not explained by the inputs used in crop production (see [13, 26, 34] ). More precisely, this accounts for the fact that the plant requires energy in order to extract water from the soil (the agronomic process). Specifically, as salt concentrations increase, it becomes increasingly difficult for the plant to absorb water, because of the energy required to access it. This extra energy used by the crops is not used for growth, inevitably leading to reduced production and sometimes to death. Maas and Hoffman [25] suggested that the crop response to salinity is first modeled by a "tolerance plateau" and then a decreasing part representing the production reduction, i.e., the effect is first slight or zero and then accelerates. Formally, we can express this mechanism by the following assumption:
This assumption represents the usual progressive reduced production growth once the level rises above the plant's tolerance threshold. This threshold will vary from crop to crop, but we can identify certain typologies. There are some plants, such as apple trees or red fruit bushes, that can be described as salt tolerant, i.e., they can thrive in saline soils; these contrast with very salt-sensitive crops, such as olive trees and asparagus plants, which do not thrive in saline soils. For the sake of clarity in our analysis and without any loss of generality, we do not include different thresholds in our model. We analyze the system as if the soil salt concentration was already above the tolerance level, in order to investigate the equilibrium. Moreover, we also assume a diminishing marginal effect of salt concentration (A (C θ ) ≤ 0) in order to avoid some tedious cases regarding the existence of the equilibrium, 3 which do not serve the purpose of this paper.
Groundwater Extraction Cost
Following the literature [12, 21, 29, 33] , groundwater use involves a stock-dependent extraction cost. We denote the unit pumping cost by c(S). This cost function is decreasing and convex, which means that at lower stock levels, it is more costly to extract water because the resource must be pumped over longer distances, and as the aquifer nears exhaustion, this unit cost increases rapidly.
Furthermore, we also assume that the unit pumping cost is zero when the aquifer is full, and there is no extra cost to withdraw one additional unit of water as well. Since the unit extraction cost is stock dependant and decreases with higher stock, it is quite realistic that pumping the first unit of water is free. As soon as the water table level depletes, this marginal cost increases and pumping one unit of water more becomes highly costly. Finally, we also assume that pumping one unit of water from the aquifer when it nears exhaustion entails infinitely exorbitant cost. 4 These assumptions are summarized below: These assumptions are obviously convenient to expose our results as simple as possible without loss of generality and prevent from discussing some boring cases related to issues of stability properties. 6 Nevertheless, these assumptions rely on basic specificities of the situation: it is costlier to tap deeper water, pumping one unit of water at a deeper elevation is costlier, and a negligible pumping cost for water near to the surface extends. 3 Changing this assumption does not lead to significant changes in our results, but makes a more confusing discussion and leads to distinguish different cases. 4 Brown [5] reports that some farmers in Beijing are now pumping from a depth of 300 m and "pumping water from this far down translates into exorbitant costs and reduced profit margins". 5 For a view of the type of cost functions that we introduce here, one can refer to c(S) = (S−S) 2 S . This function satisfies assumption 2 ∀S ≤ S. 6 As with the assumption on the marginal effect of salt concentration, avoiding these assumptions does not lead to significant changes in our results while adding unnecessary complications to the related discussion.
Net Farm Benefit
Incorporating earlier discussions on production and cost, the time t profit, π t , of the representative farmer is given by
Optimal Management
In this context, the objective of the social planner is to maximize the sum of discounted net agricultural benefits with respect to w(t) and subject to the state equations (1) and (3) and the static relation (2). Formally, the social planner's problem is given by
The transversality conditions require that the two costate variables λ t and μ t are not negative and the value of groundwater λ t S t and the cost of the salt per unit of resource μ t C θ t are driven to zero at the end of the planning period. Since salt concentration results in a damage on production, the shadow price of the concentration level corresponds to a marginal loss in the net farm benefit resulting from a unit increase in soil salt concentration. In this case, the costate variable represents the cost rather than the value of the resource (and the corresponding term in the Hamiltonian is preceded by a minus sign).
The current value Hamiltonian for the optimal management problem is
We then obtain the following first-order conditions (for an interior solution):
Equation (6) represents the usual optimality condition, which yields a marginal benefit in each period equal to the sum of the total marginal extraction cost (the sum of actual extraction cost and the opportunity cost of removing one unit of water from the ground) and the shadow cost of the soil salt concentration adjusted to the difference in salt concentration between the two reservoirs, i.e., the future impact of the new soil salt concentration due to the application of groundwater.
Equations (7) and (8) describe the law of motion of the growth rates of the two shadow prices. By using Eq. (2), Eq. (7) can be rewritten as 7
The above equation shows that the growth rate of the water scarcity rent depends on three effects. It depends on the discount factor, the change in future costs due to the variation in water stock, and the negative effect that is a combination of a dilution effect and an interdependence effect. The dilution effect, w t θ , is represented by the share of applied irrigation water in soil moisture. This is the part of the water that is added and is therefore mixed with the soil water content. The more water that is applied, the more the soil salt content is diluted. The second term, the interdependence effect,
> 0, captures the interaction between soil and aquifer through the interdependence of salt concentration in the two reservoirs and the impact of a larger water stock on the salt concentration in the soil. On the one hand, as the salt concentration in the soil increases, the salt concentration in the aquifer decreases. Given the total salt stock M and soil moisture θ, an increase in soil salt concentration means that a quantity of salt is transferred from the aquifer to the soil, leading to a reduction in the groundwater salt concentration. On the other hand, a higher water stock level reduces the soil salt concentration since an increase in the groundwater stock level results in a higher quantity of salts diluted in the aquifer, thus reducing by an equivalent amount the quantity of salt in the soil. Consequently, the water being applied will be less salty than the soil water content, which should reduce the salt concentration in the soil. 7 Using Eq. (2), we easily observe that Based on Eq. (2), Eq. (8) can be rewritten as follows:
The growth rate of the cost of soil salt concentration depends on the sum of three effects: (1) the discount rate; (2) the TFP effect, which is negative, meaning that a higher soil salt concentration reduces production and therefore reduces the soil quality value; and (3) the dilution effect, which is characterized by the exchange of water between the two reservoirs, i.e., the share of withdrawals and the share of water lost by the soil. This last term represents the role of water in salt transfer and increases the value of soil quality.
Existence and Stability of the Steady State
This section analyzes the existence of a steady state(s) and investigates the stability properties.
Existence of a Steady State
A steady state {w; S; C θ ; λ; μ}, if it exists, can be investigated by setting the time derivatives of Eqs. (1), (3), (7), and (8), respectively, to zero. We first compute the time derivative of Eq. (6):
Using Eqs. (6) and (7), we can rewrite Eq. (11) as follows:
This allows us to eliminate the shadow price λ and then to reduce the five dimensions of the system to one with only four variables {w; S; C θ ; μ}.
We can then investigate the steady state. From Eq. (1), we can directly derive the steady-state level of extraction:
As usual, the rate of extraction depends on the natural recharge and the irrigation efficiency.
From Eqs. (2) and (3), the steady state of salt concentration can be computed as a function of the stock of groundwater:
The salt concentration, at the steady state, is simply the ratio of the total salt stock M over the sum of the water contained in both reservoirs. This steady-state value highlights the importance of taking into account ecological interactions, since it relies on the aggregate amount of salts and the global quantity of water as soil and aquifer represent a unique reservoir. More formally, this corresponds to the salt quantity per unit of the global amount of water. Also, in the long run, the mixing of both water sources leads to the same salt concentration.
Using condition (8), we obtain that the steady state for the costate variable of the salt concentration as a function of the stock of groundwater is
with Z(S * ) = ρeS * θ + R(S * + θ). The cost of salt concentration depends on the negative impact on productivity relative to the share of the extracted amount of water and the part of the applied water that is in soil moisture.
Equation (12) gives the condition required for the level of water stock at the steady state. On the basis of previous observations, investigation of the existence of a steady state can be reduced to a study of the following condition:
Notice that this condition corresponds to the optimality condition (6) computed for the steady-state values. Intertemporal allocation of the resource requires that the marginal benefit (the first term between the brackets) be equal to the marginal cost. Here, the marginal cost is the sum of three components: (1) the marginal extraction cost, c(S * ) (weighted by the efficiency rate), (2) the opportunity cost to leave water in the aquifer, and (3) the cost of a marginal salt concentration in the soil.
We moreover denote by M =
M S+θ
the ratio of the stock of total salt M to the sum of water contained in both reservoirs (when the aquifer is full). In other terms, this ratio represents the salt concentration that should be observed in the long run if the aquifer would be full. We also denote the elasticity of the production function with respect to a change in the level of the recharge and the elasticity of TFP with respect to a variation of the total stock of salt as follows:
Now, the analysis of the condition ensuring the existence of a unique value of the steady-state water stock level is quite straightforward and allows us to assert that:
Proposition 1 Under assumptions 1 and 2, there exists a unique stationary equilibrium if the the following condition is satisfied:
Proof 1 For the proof, see Appendix 1.
This result implies that, in order to ensure the existence and uniqueness of the steady-state water stock level, the ratio of the change in production per 1 % change in water input to the change in salinity externality per 1 % change in soil salt concentration (when the aquifer is full) must be high enough. As long as the aquifer is full, salts are highly diluted and the salt concentration remains relatively low (by comparison with the case of lower water stock levels). Therefore, irrigation water will not induce a higher soil salinity and consequently will not modify too much the TFP, while production will be more responsive to a change in water input.
Furthermore, notice that this result also holds when the TFP remains constant (i.e., A (·) → 0), which could be the case for very large aquifers like the Ogallala Aquifer in Central United States, one of the world's largest aquifers, which is highly used for irrigation purpose.
Stability of the Dynamic System
Next, we examine the local dynamics of the system. If we denote by
, then using the method proposed by Dockner [10] to compute in a simple way the stability properties of a fourdimensional dynamic system, we find that:
Proposition Proposition 2 highlights that the stationary equilibrium is a saddle point (under sufficient condition). We moreover can remark that when the marginal TFP is small enough in the long run, i.e., when an increase in soil salinity does not hardly modify the negative impact on crop production (the TFP is constant, in other words independent of soil salinity concentration), A (.) → 0, then this sufficient condition ensuring the saddle point stability vanishes, D(S * ) → 0, and the steady state, if there exists, is always a saddle point (see also Appendix 2).
Impact of Long-Run Irrigation Efficiency
We can now investigate whether improved on-farm irrigation efficiency e will lead to an increase in soil salt concentrations. We first compute the implicit derivative of the salt concentration equilibrium:
Equation (18) highlights that the effect of an improved irrigation efficiency on soil salt concentration depends on its effect on the water table level. We thus have to study the effect of an improved efficiency on the long-term groundwater stock level to assess its effect on long-term salt concentrations. First, let us observe that Eq. (16) is such that φ(S, e) = 0, and we already know that the first derivative with respect to S is strictly positive (see the proof of proposition 1). We can therefore use the implicit function theorem to deduce the sign of Therefore, we can say that the impact of an increase in on-farm irrigation efficiency is given by the impact of an increase in e on the function φ(S, e) = 0. That is,
Before computing the relevant derivative, let us notice that Eq. (16) is equivalent to the intertemporal efficiency condition with respect to the steady-state values. This condition is therefore characterized by the difference between the marginal benefit (Bm) and by the sum of marginal costs (Cm). If we write Eq. (16) such as φ(S, e) = Bm(S, e) − Cm(S, e), then Eq. (19) can be rewritten as follows:
We therefore observe that the introduction of a better technology actually results in the emergence of behavioral effects affecting the production and cost functions [28] .
Since we only need to analyze the sign of the numerator, we have to investigate the impact of an increased irrigation efficiency on the marginal benefit and on the marginal costs. From Eq. (16), we easily notice that ∂Bm(S,e) ∂e = 0, since crop requirement is fixed. It remains therefore to sign the effect on the marginal costs.
Let us compute the derivative of interest:
Rearranging this equation based on the steady-state value of the salt concentration C S * and the costate μ * given by Eqs. (14) and (15), we obtain
Equation (23) highlights that the analysis of the impact of an increased efficiency, e, consists in comparing the relative variation of the full marginal pumping cost (the marginal extraction cost and the user cost) with the variation of the marginal value of transferring salts from the aquifer to the soil, given that salts can be diluted in both reservoirs (the aquifer and the soil).
We notice first that if A (·) = 0, i.e., there is no negative externality on productivity because of high soil salinity, then the social cost of this pollution is logically zero: μ * = 0. In this case, the sign of ∂φ(S,e) ∂e is easily checked to be positive. Our result is consistent with the literature (e.g., [2, 16, 24, 28, 37] ), namely that an increase in irrigation efficiency leads to a decrease in the water stock level. This is because a better technology affects the full marginal pumping cost. On the one hand, an increase in efficiency lowers the cost of consumption since less water is extracted in the long run,
On the other hand, we know that the longterm marginal benefit is constant. However, since an amount of water closer to crop water requirement was applied, this implies a higher rate of crop water consumption, while a lower share of water returns back to the ground. However, for the optimality condition (16) to hold in the long run, the water table level must decrease, which in turn implies that long-term marginal pumping costs are higher. Here, the fall in groundwater reserves also leads to an increase in salt concentration. As irrigation systems become more efficient, the amount of water applied tends to match more and more precisely crop water requirements, and this negates the need to leach the soil. One has to notice yet that this is because there is no externality on production caused by saline soil.
If we turn now to the case where there are some negative externalities, that is, where A (·) < 0, then the sign of Eq. (23) becomes ambiguous and two cases can be distinguished.
The Case with No Positive Leaching Externality of Irrigation Water
If improved irrigation efficiency has a higher effect on the full marginal pumping cost (compared with the effect on the salinity externality cost), then an improved irrigation system will lead to a decline in groundwater stocks and an increase in the salt concentration in the soil:
As in the benchmark case (without externalities caused by salinity), an improved irrigation efficiency reduces the amount of water applied to the field in the long run (w * ) and reduces pumping costs. Irrigation-induced soil salinity is also mitigated since less salts are transferred from the aquifer to the soil. Lower extraction levels affect the marginal value of the resource and increase the marginal cost of soil salinity (Eq. (15)). However, an increase in the irrigation efficiency reduces also deep percolation and thus contributes to maintain more salts in the soil. Nevertheless, the reduction of irrigation-induced salinity may be more or less compensated by the reduction of salts leaching, meaning that the impact on the marginal cost of salinity is sufficiently low (compared with the full marginal cost of extraction). This case corresponds therefore to the benchmark case; that is, for the optimality condition to hold, the long-term groundwater stock must be lower. However, we now know that a lower resource stock decreases salt level dilution and thus increases salt concentration in the aquifer and in the soil as well since both reservoirs are interdependent. Consequently, an improved irrigation efficiency contributes to mitigate soil leaching.
Irrigation-Induced Salinity Externality
The scenario changes when the impact on the salinity cost is so high that an improvement in irrigation efficiency leads to a reduction in the soil salt concentration:
Contrary to the case depicted in Section 4.1, the reduction in return flows is not sufficiently counterbalanced by the reduction in the amount of water applied to the field. As a result, salts accumulate in the root zone in the soil. The effect on the salinity cost, represented by the marginal value of transferring salt from the aquifer to the soil, μ * · C S * · R, thus outweighs the effect on the full marginal extraction cost. Such an increase in the social cost of soil salinity means that the impact of the concentration of salt on production is sufficiently high. More efficient irrigation increases the negative externality on the TFP, thus reducing the production output. By contrast with the first case (where groundwater stock must decrease so that the optimality condition holds in the long run), here, the resource stock level must increase so that pumping costs become higher in order to counterbalance the increase in the salinity cost. Finally, we know that a higher water stock level results in lower salt concentrations because of higher dilution effects. Beyond the "mechanical" process required to observe an increase in groundwater stock levels, we have to recall that higher salt concentrations require plants to use more energy to absorb water, which in turn reduces the amount of energy that can be used for plant growth. By contrast with the first case (where higher irrigation efficiency increases total water consumption) in the present situation, the water actually used by the crop is reduced, which leaves some amount of water leaching out some of the salt during percolation. As a result, an increase in irrigation efficiency increases water stock levels and removes salt from the soil.
Discussion
Our results enable us to take the debate about water conservation policies, one step further regarding the introduction of better technologies. Indeed, water conservation can be achieved through irrigation technology that reduces the amount of water that percolates below the root system (efficiency-improving technologies). In Israelsen et al. [17] , efficiency is achieved when the quantity of water used by the plants is higher than the amount of water delivered. However, this leads to a reduction in deep percolation that removes salt from the root zone and sustains productivity over time. Our results suggest that this definition of efficiency overlooks the potential benefits of soil irrigation for controlling soil salinity. Similarly to Jensen [18] , we claim that the use of water to control soil salinity should be considered beneficial and therefore should be accounted for models used in order to define the optimal quantity of water required to leach out salts. In other terms, efficiency should be defined as the ratio of the sum of water required for leaching and crop water requirement to the amount of water delivered to the field. This namely enables to account for the additional water demand necessary to the functioning of the soil system.
To conclude this discussion on the impact of an increased irrigation efficiency, we might briefly discuss how results would change in a setting with many agents. Such a setting is relevant to analyze the divergence between the private management of a common pool and the optimal management. A classical result in the literature on groundwater management [12, 21, 33] is that private exploitation by many agents depletes the aquifer more by comparison with the socially optimal outcome because of the existence of stock externalities and of strategic interactions. Within this context, a lower water table level should have two effects. On the one hand, it should reinforce salt concentrations and thus the negative externality on production. On the other hand, since agents do not internalize the external effects of soil salinity, both the social costs of a marginal reduction in the water table and the social cost of additional salts in the soil are not accounted for as long as agents are only concerned with their private costs. Therefore, one change that could be expected is that Eqs. (7) and (8) (the shadow price of the resource and the social cost of soil salinity) would differ. Apart from this point, the main setting of the analysis should extend to the case of many agents.
Conclusion and Future Directions for Research on Salinity Abatement
This paper contributes to the literature and introduces a quality dimension into the resource management model. It differs from most previous studies, which focus on the impact of groundwater withdrawal on water quality, by investigating the effect of groundwater extraction and quality on another ecosystem, the soil. We have studied the dynamics of socially optimal water pumping with respect to the optimal dynamics of soil salt concentration and discussed the impact of improved irrigation efficiency on soil salinity. We depicted two scenarios, in which groundwater extraction either increases or reduces soil salinity. These results point to the importance of adopting a different approach to irrigation efficiency. The most common definition is not useful in that it does not take account of other beneficial water uses, including the fact that demand for a water-based ecosystem is as important as demand for soil leaching.
However, this paper focuses on just one problem of salt-affected soil, namely the insufficient volume of irrigation water to leach away accumulated salt in the soil. Extensions to this research could include investigation of a number of other features. A first extension could be to integrate the upward movement of salt from groundwater to the soil due to capillary action. Over time, the water table may rise due to excessive irrigation and deep percolation, favoring the buildup of salt in the root zone and the surface soil. Modeling the effect of capillary water action in a resource management model would be relevant when two water sources are being used simultaneously.
Another extension would be to introduce explicit tradeoffs between investment in irrigation technology, reducing water loss, and investment in drainage technology, reducing yield losses caused by inadequate drainage. This investigation would be relevant in the context of waterlogging problems or possible water transfers from upstream to downstream users.
Appendix 1: Proof of proposition 1
By construction, the steady state {w * ; S * ; C θ * ; μ * } satisfies:
We only have to verify that φ(S) = 0 admits at least one solution. First, given assumptions 1 and 2, we observe that
We can also show that the function φ(·) is monotonic under assumptions 1 and 2:
given we assume that A (·) ≤ 0. We therefore obtain that the function φ(·) monotonically increases from −∞ to φ(S) for values of S between 0 and S. Thus, a sufficient condition for the existence of a unique steady state is that φ(S) is positive. This concludes the proof.
Appendix 2: Proof of proposition 2
As usual, focusing on the local stability of the dynamic system, we can derive the following Jacobian matrix: To find the properties of this matrix, we shall apply a method developed by Dockner [10] to investigate in a simple way the stability properties of a linearized fourdimensional dynamic system. Using this method, the eigenvalues of the system can easily be computed according to the following simple formula: According to this method, the equilibrium of the system is saddle path if det(J ) > 0 and < 0. 
